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Miller: McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
MCINTYRE IN CONTEXT:

A

VERY PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE

Arthur R. Miller*
I believe an audience always should know, as the youngsters say, where a
speaker is coming from. Thus, in the spirit of full disclosure I acknowledge that
your speaker today is a real throwback and often is heard to chant that inevitable
and universal mantra of seniors, "it all used to be much better."
It is difficult for me to realize that I have been involved with the procedure
in civil cases, particularly in the federal courts, for over half a century as
commentator, teacher, and participant. I was extremely fortunate to have learned
the basics from a stellar teacher and mentor at the Harvard Law SchoolBenjamin Kaplan. Some might say that all I know is the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (and perhaps a great deal of trivia about the New York Yankees). My
attitudes on the subject may be thought by some to be dated and perhaps a bit
ossified, but I am not embarrassed to say that central to how I look at things is a
belief in the purposes of the Federal Rules as embedded in their text by the
people who wrote them about seventy-five years ago-as stated in Rule 1, "the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."' I
fear, however, that we have been straying from that mandate.
When the Federal Rules were promulgated-in 1938-they embodied a
justice-seeking ethos. The people who wrote them believed in citizen access to
the courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps
or obfuscation. As a result, the Rules established a relatively plainly worded,
non-technical system. Because the rulemakers were deeply steeped in the
history of the technicalities of the prior English and American procedural
systems, the Rules established a simplified pleading regime for stating a
grievance that abjured factual detail, verbosity, and technicality. The objective
was, "Let's just get it on." "Let's rumble." Relatively little was demanded of
the plaintiff at the outset of a case. Just tell us why and where it hurts and what
you want, something metaphorically analogous to Oliver Twist's simple request
in Charles Dickens's novel for "more gruel, please."2
The Rules' so-called notice pleading regime prized access and only required
3
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. University Professor, New York University School
of Law.
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 1. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1011-1030 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing FED. R. Civ.
P. 1).
2.
See CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 11 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1966) (1838) ("Please Sir, I want some more.").
3.
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). One of the architects of the Federal Rules
referred to this as the "cornerstone" of the new system. See Charles E. Clark, The Influence of
Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 144, 154 (1948).
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permitting the parties to secure access to any information relevant to the subject
matter of the action.4 The objective of discovery was simple: no bonus points
for surprises-the parties should have equal access to all relevant data; the
litigation's resolution should be based on the revealed facts, not on who was
better at playing tricks or hiding the ball. A summary judgment procedure was
available to avoid trial when discovery showed there was no factual dispute
worthy of trial, but that motion was granted infrequently. 5 The case was to be
determined using the gold standard of Anglo-American dispute resolution: a
trial. When appropriate, that meant trial by jury. The process promoted
openness in litigation and honored the day-in-court principle. To me, all this
was very American! Striving to get it right after playing the game on a level
litigation field seemed a worthy objective-like apple pie, and baseball, and the
flag. And promoting its objectives seemed to me, as it had to my mentor, a
worthy calling for one's life.
That was the conception in 1938, and for many years that vision of civil
justice was pursued by the bench and bar and taught in law schools. 6 But, of
course, the earth and our society have moved, and the character of American
civil litigation has changed dramatically from what it was back then. In 1938,
the typical lawsuit involved a single plaintiff and a single defendant contesting
about a discrete number of relatively simple issues. Today, science, technology,
communications, economics, legal complexity, and mass phenomena
characterize many cases. Moreover, in the past few decades, we have
experienced a tremendous growth in multiparty, multiclaim disputes, sometimes
involving millions of people, and, of course, an extraordinary sophistication and
expansion of class and mass actions, a development that to this point largely has
been unique to the United States. These actions feature disputes about a
tremendous range of highly sophisticated and intricate matters as well as
incredibly important public policy issues that gifted attorneys are called upon to
litigate-dangerous pharmaceuticals, asbestos and other toxic substances, mass
disasters, mind numbingly complex financial transactions, technology disputes,
defective products, and improper governmental conduct. As part of this growth,
the federal courts have recognized that litigation arising out of mass phenomena
and globalization cannot be resolved the old fashioned way-one by one-and

4. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
5.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 56; Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962)
("[Rule 56(c)] authorizes summary judgment 'only where the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, . . . [and where] no genuine issue remains
for trial .... ' (alteration in original) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627
(1944))).
6. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1029. The Federal Rules were embraced by
many states, in whole or part. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of
Modern Civil Process, 1994 WiS. L. REv. 631, 632 n.1 (noting that thirty-five states have adopted
the Federal Rules).
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this has put enormous
pressure on our courts and Congress to modify existing
7
procedural norms.
The societal and technological revolutions that followed World War II
transformed the business of our national courts. Over the past sixty-five years,
we have had the most extraordinary expansion of federal substantive law in this
country's history. An examination of the workload of the federal courts in the
1930s when the Rules were birthed shows that only a comparatively limited
number of substantive areas were involved-a touch of antitrust, a little
copyright, a few patent cases, various interstate commerce matters, and, of
course, a range of state-based diversity of citizenship actions. The federal
securities laws were in their infancy, the civil rights revolution was yet to
happen. Yesterday's federal question cases represent a very small element of
what is now on the dockets of federal courts. Today's worlds of civil and human
rights, employment discrimination, environmental, consumer protection, and
product safety litigation basically did not exist when the Federal Rules were
formulated. Indeed, most of them still didn't exist when I was in law school;
there were no law school courses on those subjects in the 1950s. It was a world
of library books, fountain pens, manual typewriters, and carbon paper.
Additionally, the practice of law has become a business as much as a
profession. I mourn that change, being an old fogey. Law practice today is

highly competitive and territorial. Lawyers on both sides of the "v."-and often
even on the same side of the "v."-troll for clients and play turf games. The
mega-law firms, some now global in character, are partnerships in name only.
For many, the billable hour is supreme. Law firm marketing, replete with wining
and dining, networking meetings at posh resorts, and the distribution of glossy
brochures, is now common place. And sometimes the deal-making among
plaintiffs' lawyers has the feel of the haggling seen in the great bazaar in
Istanbul. On the defense side, the turf in a case is divided in a more genteel, less
visible fashion.
On a much more positive note, because of the tremendous development of
federal law designed to meet the desire for social justice that came to the fore in
post-World War II America, we have something we really didn't have in 1938-

7.
Two striking legislative developments in this vein are the enactment of the Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a), in 2002, and the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d), in 2005. Both statutes replaced the historic requirement of complete diversity of
citizenship with one of minimal diversity to facilitate and expand federal jurisdiction over certain
categories of complex cases. See §§ 1332(d)(2)(A)-(C), 1369(a). The American Law Institute also
has been very active on the subject. First, it approved the Complex Litigation Study in 1994, on
which I served as Reporter. Then, the Institute approved the Aggregate Litigation Project in 2009.
See Roger H. Trangsrud, Foreword: Aggregate Litigation Reconsidered, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
293, 293 (2011). See generally Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571
(2004) (discussing the impact of aggregate settlements); Symposium, Aggregate Litigation: Critical
Perspectives, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 293 (2011) (discussing aggregate litigation from fifteen
scholarly views).
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the public interest and social action bars. These "do-gooders," and I say that
with enormous respect and gratitude that they exist, resort to the civil justice
system for various ideological and social justice reasons to expand rights and
remedies for the groups they represent. 8
Much wonderful and creative legal work in the public interest has been done
by lawyers pursuing the private enforcement of public policies-indeed we
sometimes call them "private attorneys general." 9 Of course, many of these
actors operate out of mixed motivation.10 They work on a contingent fee basis,
assume enormous risks, but are entrepreneurial in outlook, although embedded in
their entrepreneurial activity often lies a strong desire to further the underlying
public policies regarding the rights they seek to vindicate. Asbestos was held2
bar.'
accountable by the private bar." Tobacco was cabined by the private
Defective pharmaceuticals such as diet drugs and Vioxx and other products are
removed from our midst, and illicit financial and market practices of companies
such as Enron are halted by the private bar.' 3 And so, some Americans don't die
or become incapacitated from defective products or toxic substances and

important social and economic policies are enforced because of what these
lawyers do by pushing the law to be more and more sensitive to the needs of
people, particularly the disadvantaged.'

4

Thus, today there are private civil

actions reinforcing laws relating to antitrust, securities, consumer protection and
unfair business practices, civil rights, employment discrimination, the disabled,
and my personal favorite, age discrimination. The work product of this segment

of the bar speaks for itself.

8. See Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131,
1183-86 (2009).
9.
See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-and
Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2133-34 (2004).
10. See Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1,
3-12 (2008).
11. See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899,
899-914 (1996) (discussing mass tort litigation, including asbestos litigation, by private attorneys);
Steve Olafson, 21 Steelworkers Who Contracted Asbestos Disease Win $115 Million, HOUST.
CHRON., Feb. 20, 1998, at Al, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.
the
(describing
mpl/1998_3035442/21 -steelworkers-who-contracted-asbestos-disease-wi.html
verdict against the Carborundum Company).
12. See Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigatorsof OrdinaryCases to Litigatorsof Extraordinary
Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219,
227 (2001) (citing Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at Al; Margaret Cronin Fisk, $145B! Husband.Wife Team Takes on the
Tobacco Goliath and Walks Away with a Monster Jury Award, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 19, 2001, at C14).
13. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at C1 (describing $253 million verdict for death related to pain drug); see
also Ronald Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of Unconsented
Sperm Harvesting and Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies,44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 451, 484-85
(2000) (discussing the ability of the private bar to control certain "deep-pocket industries").
14. See Reingold, supra note 10, at 12-3 1.
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But a backlash has set in against the private enforcement of these important
public policies-a backlash that champions corporate and governmental interests
against the claims of individual citizens or the vindication of legislative or
judicial norms. The plaintiffs' bar has been vilified as a bunch of fee-hawking
ambulance chasers; Americans have been defamed as litigious fortune hunters.
Bogus statistics are propagated and fears are spread by claims that Americans
pay a litigation tax rendering our businesses unable to compete. Politicians
make merry with their attacks on our justice system and call for "tort reform,"
and urban legends about certain cases-and sometimes imagined casesabound, typically in highly distorted form. The so-called McDonald's coffee
cup case, for example, has been grotesquely misdescribed and, aided by
simplistic media accounts, has become a cosmic anecdote. Recently, HBO aired
a documentary entitled Hot Coffee that puts the case in proper prospective.' 5 In
some respects, we are witnessing a class struggle between consumers and
"Corporate America."
This backlash has been given considerable traction by the current Supreme
Court, which has shown a broad judicial orientation generally favoring large
corporate and government defendants, which has had significant effects on
access to the federal courts and remediation. To take two examples, first,
Supreme Court decisions have eliminated liability for aiding and abetting in
certain financial contexts, no matter how egregious the conduct and the number
of people hurt, thereby heightening the litigation barrier for aggrieved citizens. 16
Second, despite the global nature of today's electronic securities market, making
where a transaction is executed irrelevant, the Supreme Court has sharply limited
the right of various groups of foreign investors to sue for alleged fraud under our
securities laws, even when the defendant company has taken advantage of the
American capital marketplace and some or most of the alleged wrongdoing has
occurred in this country. I
Substantive law decisions such as these have been accompanied by a
contemporaneous transformation of the way our courts process cases. I have
grown increasingly concerned about procedural changes effected by the Supreme
Court that have resulted in the earlier and earlier disposition of litigation and
impaired a citizen's opportunity for a meaningful adjudication of his or her
grievances. Remember the image I suggested earlier-the civil litigation gold
standard-trial before a jury. Today, there are hardly any federal civil trials-let
alone jury trials.' 8 Most courtrooms in federal courthouses are empty much of

15. HoT COFFEE (HBO Documentary Films 2011).
16. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
(citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994));
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008).
17. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010).
18. Juries now may have anywhere from six to twelve members. See Fed. R. CIV. P. 48(a).
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the time. Indeed, a contemporary clich6 is to refer to "the vanishing trial."'
Cases simply do not survive until then; they are settled or, increasingly,
dismissed, often long before trial.
This acceleration of case disposition has come about because courts have
erected a sequence of procedural stop signs over the past twenty-five years. It
has been an episodic and almost invisible process-a perfect illustration of what
my TV mentor Fred Friendly called changing policy by one degree-itis. The
phenomenon began in 1986 when the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases
invigorating the summary judgment motion, which is largely a defendant's
procedural weapon. 20 This has encouraged defendants to make the motion more
frequently and increased the likelihood of it being successful, thereby avoiding
the risks of trial. And federal judges, resonating to the three Supreme Court
decisions and possibly concerned with the length of their dockets, began to
employ summary judgment more frequently. Unfortunately, there is reason to
believe that they occasionally have inappropriately resolved trialworthy disputed
fact issues or characterized cases as "implausible," disposing of them on motion
21
rather than allowing them to go to trial.

A 1993 Supreme Court decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

the trend by emphasizing the concept of judicial
Inc.,22 continued
"gatekeeping, ' 23 which has become an article of faith. The Court directed judges
to oversee the admission of economic, scientific, and technological evidence,
particularly when it takes the form of expert testimony. 24 The resulting Daubert
motion and accompanying hearing have been especially burdensome for
plaintiffs, who often must provide expert testimony or reports about the relevant
technology or pharmacology, or the environmental impact of the defendant's
conduct, or whether the plaintiff was a victim of discrimination by an economic
entity. Gatekeeping requires screening every expert, which represents another

19. See Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge's
Lament over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTs. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010), available at
Marc Galanter,
http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2010/Where%20have%20you%20gone.pdf;
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federaland State Courts, 1
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing
Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 67 (2006).
20. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986).
21. 1have written about the implications of the 1986 trilogy at length in Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency
Clichgs Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1044-74
(2003). The literature on these cases is voluminous. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on
Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?,63 NOTRE DAME. L. REV.
770 (1988) (discussing the role of summary judgment in federal courts).
22. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Two other cases fill out the so-called Daubert trilogy. Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47
(1997).
23. See Daubert,509 U.S. at 597.
24. See id. at 589.
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procedural obstacle to reaching trial, another motion, another hearing, another
potential issue on appeal, all causing more delay and expense. This plays
perfectly into the hands of the billing-by-the-hour regime of the large firms that
usually represent corporate interests; it has precisely the opposite effect on
under-resourced contingent fee and public interest lawyers who must bear these
expenses without any assurance of reimbursement. And, when a Daubert
challenge is successful and the defense has eliminated the plaintiffs expert, the
plaintiffs case often is so weakened that it has been set up for dismissal or
abandonment-providing another avenue for early disposition of cases.
Additionally, judicially established heightened class action certification
requirements have become a major obstacle to a case's forward movement. In
many situations these judicially imposed demands effectively mean that a
plaintiff has to establish certain elements of his or her case long before trial and
without testimony or a jury.25 Most recently, for example, the Supreme Court's26
decision in the much publicized case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
involving claims of gender discrimination brought on behalf of 1.5 million
women employees, has increased the burden of showing "significant proof" of a
general policy of employment discrimination in order to secure class
certification. 27 This burden of pretrial persuasion represents another way of
effectively terminating a class action short of any adjudication of a case's
underlying merits, let alone trial or jury trial.
The class certification motion, thus, has become yet another procedural stop
sign undermining the utility of one of the most important procedural mechanisms
for handling disputes arising from large scale, small claim phenomena. If the
class cannot clear the certification hurdle, as has become more and more
common, cases are not pursued because they are not economically viable if
pursued on an individual basis, leaving broad-based harms unredressed and
important policies underenforced. 28 Even when this tactic does not succeed, the
elaborate class certification process, which now includes the possibility of
interlocutory appeal, 29 imposes additional cost and delay. Increased expense and
the heightened risk of non-certification inhibits the institution of cases, some of

25. The judicial scrutiny of class certification requests has been expanded dramatically. See,
e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2008); Oscar Private
Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogatedby Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Haliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.,
471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006).
26. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). See generally Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rodgers, 125 HARv. L. REV.
78 (2011) (discussing the implications of Dukes and other cases involving class action law suits).
27. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547, 2553-54 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159
n,15 (1982)).
28. The 1966 amendment to Rule 23 clearly envisioned the use of the class action to
empower those without "effective strength" to advance their claims. See Benjamin Kaplan, A
Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 497, 497 (1969).
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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which quite possibly would prove to be meritorious, which leaves public policies
underenforced and citizens uncompensated.
Along with Walmart, the Court's almost contemporaneous decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion replaces judges and juries with one-by-one
arbitration in many contexts better dealt with on an aggregate basis.
Consequently, powerful economic entities have imposed no class action
arbitration clauses on people in take-it-or-leave-it contracts (a practice likely to
be increased) for such things as credit cards, mobile phones, brokerage accounts,
car rentals, and a myriad of other social amenities and necessities. This is simply
the latest example of arbitration clauses that have been allowed to trump access
to the civil justice system despite contractual unconscionability or inequality of
bargaining position. There was a time when people's rights under the Fifth,
Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments were treated more seriously.
In another major procedural transformation, the Supreme Court, in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 31 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,32 erected an even earlier

impediment on the procedural road map-heightened pleading requirements.
These cases turn their backs on over sixty years of a relatively simple pleading
regime. 33 An old fogey like me thinks fondly about the actual language of the
federal pleading rule, which requires only a "short and plain statement," 34 and
remembers that the rulemakers drafted it that way to permit relatively easy
entrance into the federal courts without technicality or formality and to minimize
skirmishing over the sufficiency of the statement of the claim.35 In effect, the
rule's text says, philosophically at least, "Feel aggrieved? Well, come on in, this
is a friendly, justice seeking litigation system and we'll sort out the issues when
we get the facts during discovery."
The rule essentially was rewritten by the Supreme Court in Twombly from
requiring mere "notice" of the claim to demanding a factual statement of a
"plausible" claim, with little guidance as to what that means. 36 Plausible? What
does plausible mean? The Court's opinion tells us it's something more than
purely speculative or possible, but it can be less than probable. 37 Of course,
that's not very helpful. The Court was more specific two years later in Iqbal,

30. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See generally Resnik, supra note 26, at 122-33 (discussing the
AT&T Mobility decision and class arbitration).
31. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
32. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
33. Twombly and Iqbal were preceded by an unbroken string of Supreme Court
reaffirmations of the easy access principle of Rule 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.,
534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, §§ 1215-54
(discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 8).
35. See generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1217.
36. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "Plausible" thus has become the mantra-like concept for
motions under both Rule 56 and Rule 12(b)(6).
37. Id. at 555-56.
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saying it means that the pleading must "show"-a word in the rule never
previously focused on or thought to be a qualitative requirement-that there is a
reasonable possibility of a right to relief. 38 And how are district judges supposed
to divine that? The Court has invited them to use their "judicial experience and
common sense." 39 Hmmm, so-to be a bit sarcastic-that means a newly
appointed judge has no judicial experience to employ, and we are supposed to
believe that common sense is generously and equally distributed among federal
judges. In addition, the district judge is to compare the actionable nature of the

challenged conduct to a hypothesized innocent explanation of the defendant's
actions, which sounds very much like evaluating the merits of a case, rather than
simply determining the legal sufficiency of the statement, on the basis of a single
document-the complaint-without having the benefit of discovery, let alone
anything remotely approximating a trial.4n
Remember, a motion to dismiss classically has been viewed-for hundreds
of years-as a procedure that only determines the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. 41 It asks a simple question of law-does the complaint state a legally

cognizable claim? For example, suppose I claim that one of my students gave
me a dirty look in class. Whatever procedural system you test that pleading
under, it is vulnerable to a motion to dismiss-as it was to a code motion to
dismiss, or a common law demurrer 42-if directing a dirty look at another is not

actionable under the governing substantive tort law. Conversely, if there were
such a tort, the case would proceed.
The pleading challenge had nothing to do with what actually happened to the

plaintiff, let alone who should win on the merits. Absolutely nothing. As any
good civil procedure instructor tells his or her class each year, on a motion to
dismiss, the judge is supposed to bend over backwards, accept the allegations as
43
pleaded, and interpret the complaint in the light most favorable to the pleader.
But now the motion to dismiss may well become a trial-type inquiry based on

nothing but judicial intuition and subjectivity with the capability of terminating a

38. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
39. Id. (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937).
40. It has been suggested with some persuasiveness that the cases have merged the motion to
dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 61 (2007) (discussing Twombly and arguing in favor of "mini-summary judgments"); Suja A.
Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15 (2010) (discussing the convergence of the motion to dismiss and the
motion for summary judgment). My concern is that in some cases the plausibility determination
will transgress the limited judicial inquiry permitted by Rule 56 on a summary judgment motion.
41. See generally 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, §§ 1355-57 (discussing FED. R. CIv.
P. 12(b)(6)).
42. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 78, at 501 (2d
ed. 1947); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING §§ 146-47 (Henry
Winthrop Ballantine ed., 3d ed. 1923).
43. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1,§ 1353, at 417 (citations omitted).
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case at its outset. So, as they say in the land of my youth, Brooklyn, in one "fell
swoop" those two recent Supreme Court decisions destabilized both the
established pleading standard and the motion to dismiss practice under the
Federal Rules. 44
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ignored the problem of information
asymmetry.45 In many modern litigation contexts, the critical information, such
as the formulation and testing of a pharmaceutical, is entirely in the defendant's
possession and is unavailable to the plaintiff. I can understand requiring a
plaintiff to plead what he or she knows or should and could know with
reasonable effort, but it is rather futile and a bit absurd to tell someone to plead
what he or she doesn't know. Discovery was designed to provide each side with
access to relevant information that was beyond its reach so that the litigation
playing field would be level and more informed settlements and trials would be
possible.
Employment discrimination cases provide a useful example. The plaintiff
has been fired. One of the first rules of discharge is don't tell the employee why.
If facts must be pleaded to state a claim for discriminatory discharge or failure to
promote, or some other possibly nefarious practice, how can the plaintiff
surmount the newly minted pleading requirement? How does the plaintiff show
discriminatory conduct-let alone a pattern or practice of discriminationwithout access to the employer's conduct regarding not only the plaintiff, but its
history regarding other employees? Unfortunately, employment discrimination
cases are not being instituted-let alone surviving-in many parts of the
country. 46 In a different context, analogous to that in Iqbal, how does a pleader
challenge illegal or unconstitutional governmental action-whether by a
municipal, state, or federal employee-without deposing and seeking documents
from members of the department or agency in which that challenged conduct
took place?
To me, it makes no sense to apply the new pleading standard to slip-and-fall
cases, fender benders, and a wide swath of lawsuits that do not require extensive
gatekeeping, with its attendant cost, delay, and risk of premature termination.
And yet, the new pleading principles were said by the Court in Iqbal to apply to
all federal civil actions. So, where are we? Pleading facts now seems to be

44. My less than complimentary views of Twombly and Iqbal are spelled out at length in
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure,60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010).
45. See id. at 43, 45-46.
46. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryan Lancaster, Individual Justice or
Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights
United States, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 195 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The

ChangingShape of FederalCivil PretrialPractice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2010).
47. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1). In one
relatively recent case that I just love (in truth I hate it), the plaintiff slipped in a grocery store and
was seriously injured; the court dismissed the action. Why? Because the plaintiff failed to plead
what the substance on the floor was, how it got there, how long it had been there, and whether
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what is required of plaintiffs, which represents a throwback to the discarded code
procedure era. 48 The Supreme Court has moved the system from a requirement
of giving notice, which is what the pleading rule was designed to accomplish, to
a more detailed fact pleading structure, which is exactly what the Federal Rules
were drafted to reject.
And, most recently, late last Term the Court pushed the envelope in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,49 one of the two cases that bring us
together for this conference. The Justices divided 4-to-2-to-3 (a very odd double
play combination for you baseball fans) regarding the constitutional limits on the
permissible personal jurisdiction reach of courts over defendants who are not
present in the forum. 50 Departing analytically and linguistically from its
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence going back sixty-five years to the seminal
decision in International Shoe Corp. v. Washington,51 four Justices clearly
signaled a contraction of that reach. According to the McIntyre plurality, the
Constitution "permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can
be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the
52
It
defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.'
now appears that a corporate defendant may be able to structure its distribution
system and send products to all fifty states, while avoiding the reach of any, or
almost any, individual state's courts. No longer would injured consumers and
employees be free to bring cases where they receive defective products or
services, or live, or were injured; rather, plaintiffs might have to litigate in
distant fora, and possibly in other countries, or abandon their claims altogether.
Despite the expressed concern of Justice Kennedy for the small Florida
farmer whose produce may be marketed nationally, and of Justice Breyer for the
Appalachian potter being sued in Alaska or Hawaii, 53 the obvious beneficiaries
of McIntyre's constriction on personal jurisdiction will be manufacturers,
pharmaceutical companies, and other significant economic entities. In my view,
the four plurality Justices should not have focused on formal contacts and
notions of sovereignty and the defendant's intent to submit to the forum, with no
acknowledgement that the farmer and potter can be protected by the principles of

anyone else had slipped and fallen. Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL
2604447, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009). How was the plaintiff supposed to know these things
without access to discovery?
48. Some commentators warned that this was upon us even before Twombly and Iqbal. See,
e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 987, 1007-08 (2003)
(citations omitted) (detailing how code pleading survives in federal courts as "hyperpleading");
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986) ("[F]act pleading, the bete noir of the codes, seems to be enjoying
a revival in a number of areas.").
49. 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011).
50. See id. at 2785 (plurality opinion).
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion).
53. See id. at 2790; id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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fair play and substantial justice recognized in InternationalShoe and reprised in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.54 That is why I view McIntyre as
yet another procedural stop sign, this one posted at the very genesis of the case.
The McIntyre plurality opinion is an open invitation to defense interests to
exploit this stop sign for all it is worth. Next, we will be barring the courthouse
door to all but a chosen few.
When one takes a panoramic view of these phenomena, and the emergence
of other issues that courts now demand be focused on early in the proceedings,
such as standing and preemption, there is no secret about what is happening or
frankly, why and who benefits. Previously, we had a commitment to trial, and
when appropriate, jury trial. Then, the summary judgment motion began to
replace that possibility of trial. Now, we have a potentially dispositive pleading
motion coming even earlier than the summary judgment motion, which, when
granted, prevents any trial. Along the way, Daubert gatekeeping and class
action restrictions have presented other stop signs. And most recently, McIntyre
offers a heightened prospect of a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. These cases
have created procedural playthings for defendants that, not surprisingly, are now
being employed with increased frequency 55 and producing an increased number
of dismissals. 56 More motions, more delays, more costs, more appeals, and
potentially more early dismissals. It leads me to suggest that the system is
suffering from a serious untreated case of premature termination.
We are moving toward a system in which an increasing number of civil
actions may be stillborn. Case disposition is moving back in time and is based
on less and less information regarding the merits of a dispute. A trial provides
live evidence, examination, cross-examination, and often the deliberation of a
jury. Summary judgment is based on lawyers' papers, although it often is
delayed until after discovery, thereby at least giving both sides equal access to

54. 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) ('The strictures of the
Due Process Clause forbid [the] exercise [of] personal jurisdiction under circumstances that would
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'). McIntyre did nothing to resolve
the confusion created by the three divergent opinions in Asahi. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. Thus,
serious ambiguities about critical jurisdictional aspects of modem commerce and manufacturing
continue to exist. Even more difficult questions are posed by the various activities that take place
on the Internet.
55. See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 8

(2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqb
al.pdf. The notion that the cases have not substantially impacted dismissal practices and outcome is
forcefully contested in Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure: An Assessment of the
FederalJudicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. COURTS L. REV. 2 (2011), available
at http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2010/Hoffman.pdf. The author points to the increased costs
imposed by the significant increase in the incidence of motions to dismiss and the increased
likelihood after Iqbal that the motion will be granted. Id. at 10, 16; see also SCOTr DODSON,
SLAMMING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS: NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

(Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2013).
56. See Hoffman, supra note 55, at 10.
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the facts. The motion to dismiss, however, is based only on the complaint. No

discovery. No evidence. No witness testimony. No cross-examination. No
voice of the community. Adjudication based on paper should be the exception,
not the rule. Deciding cases based on a single paper-the complaint-as
evaluated by subjective factors such as judicial experience and common sense
and an abstract comparison to a hypothesized innocent explanation is a process
that is alien to me. And, personal jurisdiction challenges, of course, have
nothing to do with the central justice question-who should win and who should

lose.
But it must be acknowledged that there are concerns of uncertain dimension
and significance that provide some justification for what has happened. Judges
have very real docket pressures and discovery, especially e-discovery, can be
extremely resource consumptive in large-scale cases. Even a fossil like me
recognizes the need for some change; however, the extent of the changes that
have occurred and how they came about has produced a one-sided effect on
access and the day-in-court principle. Our most important litigation values have
been impaired by the erection of procedural stop signs, and produced a collateral
cost far too high to be justified by demands for efficiency, especially when the
supposed rationale for these changes lacks any real empirical support.
A majority of the Justices have offered three propositions to justify the
changes in the procedural regime: there is a threat of abuse, litigation is
expensive, and the possibility of extorted settlements must be avoided.51
Assertions of abuse are not new. When I was the Reporter to the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee in the late 1970s and during the first half of the 19 80s, the
focus was on containing the pretrial process, because that is where systemic cost
and delay resided. Even then, the defense bar and its clients were complaining
about abuse and frivolous litigation and the need for cost reduction-the
drumbeat for reform was constant and noisy. Urban legends and cosmic
anecdotes were being propagated. 58 All of this being new to me at the time, I
spent six months going to bar association meetings and judicial conferences
asking people to tell me about abuse and frivolous litigation so that I could aid
the Committee in pursuing intelligent rule revision. I was like Diogenes holding
my lamp high, searching for "truth." I listened and listened and listened. After
six months, I reported to the Committee that I had learned a great deal about
abuse and frivolous litigation. I could tell them with considerable confidence
that, according to the practicing bar, frivolous litigation is any case brought
against your client, and abuse is anything the opposing lawyer is doing.

57. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559-60 (2007); see also Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's new approach "creates greater symmetry between the plaintiffs and the defendant's
litigation costs, and by doing so reduces the scope for extortionate discovery").
58. As the great baseball philosopher Yogi Berra might say, what we are hearing today is
"dj vu all over again." YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 30 (1998).
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More than thirty years have now passed and except at the margins, I cannot
do any better in identifying litigation abuse and frivolousness or in
distinguishing it from legitimate advocacy. We have never defined it; we have
never measured its frequency; we don't know who is guilty of it. In my
judgment, it simply lies in the eyes of the beholder. Despite its amorphousness,
however, these abstractions motivate judicial decisionmaking, apparently
including that of Supreme Court Justices.
And what of extortionate settlements? How many times does that occur?
Again, we simply don't know. I don't think we even know what an extortionate
settlement is or how to recognize one. 59 Some settling defendants find it useful
to proclaim, "Oh, we were extorted." How do we know that is true? We don't.
People and entities settle cases for a myriad of varied human and business
reasons that they believe will further their self-interest, and those reasons may
have little or nothing to do with the validity of the asserted claims or defenses.
And what about complaints regarding costs? Of course no one likes them.
But again, we really don't know that much about the economic aspects of
litigation. The limited empirical evidence we have, which often is simply
impressionistic or simplistic, is largely focused only on defense costs-never the
plaintiffs, the judicial system's, or society's-and suggests that in most cases
costs are less than what they often are claimed to be, and that the very high cost
cases represent only a rather small slice of the federal workload.
Even as to
"big" cases, we don't know how much of the cost and delay are the result of
tactical decisions by the defense that are driven by its economic self-interest
regarding billing, and reflect practices of attrition and dilatoriness, as opposed to
the hyperactivity and fishing expeditions of the plaintiffs' bar. Yet all of the
procedural stop signs with which plaintiffs must contend apply to every case.
Now that the judiciary has shifted the procedural system dramatically
against plaintiffs by moving the specter of case termination forward in time,
denying access to discovery, limiting forum choice, and requiring potential
plaintiffs to engage in pre-institution investigation, including finding snitches
among a defendant's employees (which is what plaintiffs' lawyers often must do
in the hope of pleading enough to survive a motion to dismiss), could it be that it
is the defense bar that has been empowered by various procedural changes to
extort settlements that are artificially low? Maybe that is the real extortion
phenomenon-not contingent fee plaintiffs extorting settlements from
defendants. Or, maybe it's a bit of both? Or, maybe extortion really is a

59. Nonetheless, courts repeat the rhetoric. See, e.g., William 0. Gilley Enters., Inc. v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 659, 667, 668 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasizing the Supreme Court's settlement
language in Twombly and stating that the complaint in the case at issue was "the type of 'in
terrorem increment of the settlement value' that the Supreme Court mentioned in Twombly"
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558)).
60. See EMERY G. LEE Ill & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 1, 2 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/

dissurvl.pdf/$file/dissurvl.pdf; Miller, supra note 44, at 61-7 1.
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nonissue? We don't know. We do... not ... know. Dramatic procedural shifts
have occurred based on unsubstantiated assertions and assumptions.
A majority of the Justices seem quite concerned about the litigation burdens
on corporations and governmental officials and have expressed little concern for
other values. 6' Shouldn't we care about the litigation burdens on plaintiffs?
Shouldn't we care that potentially meritorious cases involving important public
62
policy and private interest matters are being deterred from being instituted?
Shouldn't we care about cases being dismissed because of procedural stop signs
despite obvious information asymmetry or potential merit? Shouldn't we care
that possible antitrust and civil rights and consumer violations and product
failures are not being deterred or compensated for, or that people are being
improperly detained by government action?
What is happening to this nation's longstanding legislative and judicial
commitment to the private enforcement of its most fundamental public policies
and constitutional principles? If the procedural rules are not conducive to
litigation designed to vindicate those policies, or if cases pursuing that end
cannot be lodged in a convenient place or survive a motion to dismiss, they
won't be initiated and those policies will not be furthered. In my judgment, that
is not what our system is designed to achieve. As I have said, I believe in the
goals of the system as stated in Rule 1: "the just, speedy, and inexpensive"
determination of civil actions. Yet, the Supreme Court has given primacy to
efficiency and systemic cost reduction, perhaps at the expense of a true search
for truth. Yes, we would like some speed in resolving litigation. Yes, we would
like the process to be inexpensive. But remember the third word in Rule 1"just." Although the word is shorter than the other two, seeking a "just" result is
at least as important as the other objectives. I fear that after more than seventy
years, the Rules have lost their moorings, and some in the profession, both on the
bench and in the practicing bar, have lost sight of the objectives our procedural
system should pursue. Each year I ask my first year procedure students, "Why
do we have courts?" The replies are predictably platitudinous. And yet, after
asking the question for more than fifty years and watching the procedural
changes of the last quarter century, I no longer am clear as to what the answer is
today.
The developments I have described represent a downgrading of the day-incourt principle and the commitment to jury trial in favor of accelerated decisionmaking by judges. It should be obvious that procedural stop signs primarily
further the interests of defendants, particularly those defendants who are repeat
players in the civil justice arena-large businesses and governmental entities.
Not surprisingly, people ask me: "Is this a business oriented Supreme Court?" or

61. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
62. None of the available empirical evidence purports to measure these effects of
inappropriate procedural dismissals. Indeed, it is doubtful that they can be effectively measured.
See Hoffman, supra note 55, at 30.
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occasionally, someone will assert, with a certain bite in his or her voice: "The
Chamber of Commerce seems to have a seat on the Supreme Court." Is there
any truth to this? I often equivocate in my answer. But I do suppose it is fair to
say that some of the Justices have a clearly defined predilection that favors
business and governmental interests. Similarly, I do not think it unfair to say
that several of the members of the current Court and significant parts of the
federal judiciary are anti-litigation, which, of course, negatively impacts citizen
access, which works against those in our lower and middle classes. That is an
unfortunate echo of today's societal inequities and the stunning disparity in
power, income, and status in our nation.
What appears to be happening simply isn't the procedural process that some
of us dinosaurs grew up with, and frankly, I don't think a system that focuses on
gatekeeping, early termination, and erecting procedural stop signs befits the
aspirations of the American civil justice system. To me, this is a rather myopic
field of vision. At a time when the complexities of American life and the need
for a level litigation field seem to be increasing constantly, our courts should
focus on how to make the civil justice system available to promote our public
policies-by deterring those who would violate them and by providing efficient
procedures to compensate those who have been damaged. Our judges should
concentrate on effectuating the vision of the rulemakers of the 1930s and
extending the principle of citizen access and the resolution of cases on the
merits.
A Supreme Court that appears preoccupied with ways of avoiding
adjudication on the merits seems no further advanced in answering the question
of why we have courts than my students and I have been all these years. If
necessity is the mother of invention, perhaps it is time to declare that our civil
justice system is in a state of necessity, and the time has come to reestablish
some of the procedural features many of us were proud to practice. There are a
myriad of possibilities for achieving the objectives of Rule 1 other than putting
up stop signs. Let's explore them. Our aspirations should be those that took us
to the moon and beyond. They should not be to construct a procedural Maginot
Line to impair meaningful citizen access to our courts.

63. See Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1997).
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